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Notes and Comments
The Soft Drink Act: Soft on Vertical
Restraints?
I. Introduction
Vertical restraints,1 imposed by manufacturer on his distrib-
utor, 2 restrict the distributor's freedom to sell the manufac-
turer's product s and frequently prevent distributors of the same
1. Vertical restraints can be broadly placed into two categories: vertical sales restric-
tions and vertical price restrictions. ABA ANrimRusT SECTON, Vertical Restrictions Lim-
iting Intrabrand Competition 2 (Monograph No. 2, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Mono-
graph]. Vertical price restrictions, often referred to as resale price maintenance, are
restrictions imposed by the manufacturer on the distributor's pricing of the product for
resale. A manufacturer would typically set a minimum or maximum resale price. Resale
price maintenance is a per se violation of the antitrust laws. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 US. 373, 404-09 (1911). Vertical price restrictions are not
within the scope of this comment. For a discussion of their treatment, see generally
Monograph, supra.
Vertical restraints, as used in this comment, refer to vertical sales restrictions, in
which the manufacturer imposes non-price restrictions on the sale of his product. Verti-
cal restraints of this nature are frequently imposed through a bilateral agreement be-
tween manufacturer and distributor or manufacturer and retailer. For a discussion of the
various forms which vertical sales restrictions may take, see infra the discussion in Part
II of this comment and accompanying notes.
2. Restraints which are imposed by a manufacturer on his distributor are vertical
because they exist between persons on different levels of the market structure, e.g., be-
tween manufacturer and distributor or manufacturer and retailer. Horizontal restraints
exist between persons who are on the same level of the market structure and who would
normally be in competition with one another, e.g., between distributor and distributor. It
is important to distinguish between vertical and horizontal restraints due to the respec-
tive legal consequences. Horizontal restraints are illegal per se. See infra note 63. On the
other hand, vertical restraints are judged according to the rule of reason and may or may
not be legal, depending on the circumstances.
3. One common means of restricting a distributor's freedom to sell is through an
agreement containing territorial restrictions. Under such an agreement, the distributor
promises that he will not sell the goods outside a defined geographic area. See Note,
Restricted Channels of Distribution Under the Sherman Act, 75 HAiv. L. Rsv. 795
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Restricted Channels]. His sales will therefore be limited to
customers who live or maintain their places of business within that area. Id. at 796. This
comment will focus primarily on territorial restrictions in its discussion of vertical re-
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brand of product from competing with one another.4 Thus, verti-
cal restraints limit intrabrand competition. But since vertical re-
straints create efficiencies in a manufacturer's distribution sys-
tem, they enable him to compete more effectively with
manufacturers of other brands of products. Thus, vertical re-
straints promote interbrand competition.
Because of their simultaneous anticompetitive and procom-
petitive effects, vertical restraints have been closely scrutinized
by the courts to determine whether they violate the antitrust
laws. The courts have applied two standards in their examina-
tion of vertical restraints: the per se rule5 and the rule of rea-
son. An application of the per se rule requires vertical restraints
straints as employed in the soft drink industry.
4. If a manufacturer sets up his entire distribution system with territorial restric-
tions, all of his distributors will confine their sales to their designated area. Therefore,
they will not compete with each other for any retail accounts or compete for the same
retail customers. If a retailer wishes to purchase that brand of product, he must purchase
it from the distributor in his area, at that distributor's price.
5. The per se rule was announced in Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356
U.S. 1 (1957). The rationale of the per se rule was as follows: "However, there are certain
agreements or practices which because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack
of any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore ille-
gal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business
excuse for their use." Id. at 5.
One justification which has been proposed in support of application of the per se
rule to vertical sales restrictions is that all such agreements have a collusive aspect. "Dis-
tributors who are parties to such agreements are generally aware that parallel arrange-
ments are being made with their potential competitors; thus, the granting of an exclusive
franchise to a distributor is an implicitly collusive quid pro quo for his acceptance of a
limited territorial or customer outreach." Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrange-
ments: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAw & CoNTMPP. PROBS.
506, 510 (1965).
6. The rule of reason was first introduced as a legal standard by which to analyze
possible violations of the antitrust laws in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1, 63-70 (1911). The factors which are to be considered in a rule of
reason analysis were aptly stated by Justice Brandeis in Board of Trade of Chicago v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regu-
lates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may sup-
press or even destroy competition. To determine that question the court must
ordinarily consider the facts perculiar to the business to which the restraint is
applied: its condition before and after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the
restraint and its effect, actual and probable. The history of the restraint, the evil
believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular remedy, the purpose or
end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id. at 238.
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to be declared illegal without further inquiry. An application of
the rule of reason requires the factfinder to weigh all the circum-
stances peculiar to the case in determining whether vertical re-
straints impose an unreasonable restraint on trade and therefore
violate the antitrust laws. Congress recently introduced what has
been perceived as another standard into this controversial area
of antitrust law by enacting the Soft Drink Interbrand Competi-
tion Act.7
The Soft Drink Act sets a standard to judge the legality of
certain vertical restraints contained in agreements between soft
drink companies and their trademark licensees. It states that
territorial restrictions in the distribution of soft drink products
will not violate the antitrust laws8 "[provided: That such prod-
uct is in substantial and effective competition with other prod-
7. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3501-03 (West Supp. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Soft Drink Act or
Act]. The Soft Drink Act was controversial and hotly debated by Congress. Critics of the
Act labeled it "special interest legislation in its worst form." H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Nswa 2373, 2385. They
insisted that it "would introduce an unnecessary and uncertain element into the law of
vertical restraints, and would unfairly tip the scales in favor of the soft drink industry at
the expense of the consuming public." Id. at 2381.
Furthermore, although the Soft Drink Act relates specifically to only one industry, it
is likely to be the predecessor of future legislative proposals by other industries. During
the Senate debates on the Soft Drink Act, Senator Metzenbaum, opposing the Act, ex-
pressed his view on the likelihood of this domino effect:
Others will say "We should not have to comply with the antitrust laws either."
They will say that automotive dealers ought to be protected in their territo-
rial rights.
They will say that television manufacturers or refrigerator makers, or any one
of a host of other manufacturers of products that are on the market, need protec-
tion, need territorial restrictions, and that the antitrust laws should not be
applicable.
And if they hire the best lobbyists, and if they organize back home, get
enough people to call, they will again prevail upon the Congress to provide that
exemption once the pattern has been set.
126 CoNG. Rac. S5409 (daily ed. May 15, 1980) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum).
The Soft Drink Act was, in fact, the predecessor to simila legislation in at least one
other industry. The Malt Beverage Interbrand Competition Act, introduced by Congress-
man Jack Brooks of Texas in late April, 1981, would provide the brewing industry the
same protections as the soft drink industry. Malt Beverage Interbrand Competition Act,
H.RL 3269, S. 1215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
8. Section 5 of the Soft Drink Act states: "As used in this Act, the term 'antitrust
law' means the Sherman Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)], the Clayton Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 12,
13, 14-19, 20, 21, 22-27 (1976) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 53 (1976)], and the Federal Trade
Commission Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1976)]." Soft Drink Act, supra note 7, § 5, 15
U.S.C.A. § 3503.
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ucts of the same general class in the relevant market or mar-
kets." Thus, the standard of the Soft Drink Act for judging the
legality of vertical restraints focuses on the quantity and quality
of interbrand competition.
Congress enacted the Soft Drink Act to codify the rule of
reason,10 which the Supreme Court, in Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc.," held to be the standard applicable in
determing the legality of vertical restraints. 2 Soon after the Syl-
vania decision, but before passage of the Act, the Federal Trade
Commission applied the rule of reason to antitrust proceedings
brought against Coca-Cola s and Pepsico, Inc.'4 The Commis-
sion, ruling that the territorial exclusivity provisions in agree-
ments bitween these soft drink companies and their licensees 8
9. Soft Drink Act, supra note 7, § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 3501.
10. The House Report (Judiciary Committee), reporting on and recommending pas-
sage of the Soft Drink Act, stated that the "legislation restates the rule of reason ap-
proach followed by the Supreme Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTESylvania Inc.,
433 U.S. 36 (1977)." H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2373 (footnote omitted). Likewise, President Carter, when sign-
ing the Act into law, stated that its purpose was to "realilrm[] legislatively the rule of
reason approach ....." 16 WsmmY Comp. oF PREs. Doc. 1334 (July 14, 1980).
11. 433 U.S. 36 (1977) Sylvania is a seminal case in the area of vertical restraints. It
overruled a previous case which had determined vertical restraints to be illegal per se
and established the rule of reason as the standard to be applied in judging the legality of
vertical restraints. For a detailed discussion and analysis of the Sylvania decision, see
infra Part III of this comment and accompanying footnotes.
12. Id. at 59.
13. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978).
14. Pepsico, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 680 (1978). Although the cases against Coca-Cola Co.
and Pepsico, Inc. were two separate proceedings, the factual circumstances of both cases
were so similar that for expediency, the trial record of Coca-Cola Co. was incorporated
into the proceeding against Pepsico, Inc. See id. at 686 (stipulation 5(c)). The discussion
in this comment relates specifically to the Coca-Cola Co. case, but it applies equally to
Pepsico, Inc.
15. The agreements typical in the soft drink industry combine both exclusive
franchises and territorial restrictions. The manufacturer sells syrups to a designated bet-
tier and grants him an exclusive license to manufacture, distribute and sell the trade-
marked beverage within a specified area. In turn, the bottler agrees not to sell outside his
defined geographic area. For instance, a typical agreement between Coca-Cola and its
bottlers provides as follows:
COMPANY agrees to furnish to BOTTLER, and only to furnish for the territory
herein referred to, sufficient syrup for bottling purposes to meet the requirements
of BOTTLER in the territory herein described.
.... COMPANY does hereby select BOTTLER as its sole and exclusive cus-
tomer and licensee for the purpose of bottling the Bottlers' bottled syrup, COCA-
COLA, in the territory described.
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constituted unreasonable restraints on trade and unfair competi-
tion,' entered cease and desist orders.17 Subsequent to the en-
actment of the Soft Drink Act, however, the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia s set aside those orders, holding
that they were "based upon legal standards which differ from
those in the... Soft Drink Act."19 The court of appeals rea-
soned that, rather than codifying the rule of reason standard,
the Soft Drink Act introduced a new standard into the analysis
of vertical restraints. To date, no court has analyzed or applied
[BOTTLER agrees].., not to use trade-marks COCA-COLA or COKE, nor
bottle nor vend said product except in the territory herein referred to. This limita-
tion, however, is not to prevent BOTTLER from acquiring similar rights for other
territory ....
Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 521 (1978).
16. Id. at 674. In 1971, the Federal Trade Commission issued administrative com-
plaints against the Coca-Cola Co. and Pepsico, Inc., stating that the agreements between
these two companies and their trademark licensees included territorial exclusivity provi-
sions which constituted unreasonable restraints on trade and therefore violated § 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976). An administrative law judge, after
making detailed findings of fact and applying the rule of reason test, held that the terri-
torial restrictions did not constitute unreasonable restraints on trade and were therefore
legal. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 589 (1978) (initial decision of Administrative Law
Judge). Thus, the complaint filed by the Federal Trade Commission was dismissed.
On appeal, the Federal Trade Commission conducted a de novo review of the record
and applied Sylvania to conclude that the provisions granting exclusive territories did
constitute an unreasonable restraint of trade and unfair competition. Id. at 674 (Opinion
of the Federal Trade Commission). The Federal Trade Commission reasoned that the
restrictive agreements prevented intrabrand competition and that there were no counter-
balancing legitimate business justifications for the restraint. Id.
17. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. at 674; Pepsico, Inc., 91 F.T.C. at 697.
18. Coca-Cola Co. v. F.T.C., 642 F. 2d 1387 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
19. Id. at 1390. In light of the court of appeals decision, complaints against five
other soft drink manufacturers were dismissed by a Federal Trade Commission adminis-
trative law judge and upheld by the Federal Trade Commission, presumably because
they agreed with the court of appeals that the situation was now governed by a different
standard. Crush Intl Ltd., No. 8853; Dr. Pepper Co., No. 8854; The Seven-Up Co., No.
8857; Royal Crown Cola Co., No. 8858; Norton Simon Inc., No. 8877 [July-Dec.] Arm-
TRUST & TtADs Ro. REP. (BNA) No. 1025, at A-17 (July 21, 1981). The complaints
against these companies were similar to those issued against Coca-Cola and Pepsico. The
Federal Trade Commission charged that the territorial exclusivity provisions which were
contained in the licensing agreements between the companies and their bottlers reduced
or destroyed competition in the distribution system, thereby denying the benefits to the
consumer. Id.
These dismissals were upheld by the Federal Trade Commission. Crush Intl Ltd.,
No. 8853; Dr. Pepper Co., No. 8854; The Seven-Up Co., No. 8857; Royal Crown Cola Co.,
No. 8858; Norton Simon, Inc., No. 8877 [July-Dec.] Arrmr sr & Tnsnn Rz. RaN'.
(BNA) No. 1032, at A-22 (Sept 17, 1981).
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the standard of the Soft Drink Act, thus leaving unanswered the
questions: what is the standard, and how, if at all, does it differ
from the rule of reason?
This comment answers those questions and explains the dif-
ferences, if any, between the two standards. Part II discusses va-
rious product distribution systems, the economic advantages and
disadvantages of vertical restraints, and their present use in the
soft drink industry. Part HI traces the legal treatment of vertical
restraints from 1948 to the present. Part IV analyzes the stan-
dard of the Soft Drink Act for determining the legality of verti-
cal restraints by defining it, applying it, and comparing it to the
rule of reason. This comment concludes that the standard of the
Soft Drink Act, although its approach is significantly different,
is a positive restatement of the rule of reason.
II. Product Distribution Systems and Vertical Restraints
A manufacturer, balancing the amount of control which he
wants to maintain over his product against the resulting costs,
may choose among a variety of distribution systems for his prod-
uct.2 0 He may choose a vertically integrated system whereby the
manufacturer maintains complete control over the product from
its manufacture to sale to the ultimate consumer.21 This option,
although costly,22 is appealing to the manufacturer who is con-
cerned with controlling his product's price, distribution, quality,
and image.
A manufacturer may also choose to distribute his product
through a completely independent distributor, whereby he
20. See generally Restricted Channels, supra note 3; Note, Vertical Restrictions
and the Distribution Process: A Practical Review of Economics and the Rule of Reason
After Sylvania, 38 LA. L. Rav. 1022 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Vertical Restrictions);
Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy
Standards, 30 LAw & CoNEmP. PRoBs. 506 (1965); Posner, Antitrust Policy and the
Supreme Court: Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Poten-
tial Competition Decisions, 175 CoLuM. L. Rav. 282 (1975). Each article contains a gen-
eral discussion of the various types of vertical restrictions and their economic usefulness
and business justifications.
21. Vertical integration is defined as "[o]wnership or control of network of produc-
tion and distribution of goods from raw materials to sale to ultimate consumer." BLACK'S
LAw DicnroNaRv 1401 (5th ed. 1979). See also Vertical Restrictions, supra note 20, at
1033.
22. See Vertical Restrictions, supra note 20, at 1033.
[Vol. 2:249
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transfers total control of his product to the distributor.' Once
the manufacturer sells his product to the distributor, the distrib-
utor is free to price the product and choose the method of resale.
Under such a distribution system the manufacturer forfeits con-
trol over his product, but shifts many of the costs of distribution
and merchandising to the distributor," such as providing ware-
house and service facilities, training and maintaining personnel,
and maintaining inventory.25 The manufacturer's choice of a dis-
tribution system will be a business decision, based on several
factors including cost efficiencies,26 capital availability, 27 and the
product's character.
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. Restricted Channels, supra note 3, at 806.
26. The use of independent distributors lowers the costs to a manufacturer in sev-
eral ways. First, by limiting the number of buyers of his product, the manufacturer
reduces his selling costs. Id. at 805. Second, the manufacturer is able to lower his credit
risk and resulting cost by designating a solvent and fiscally responsible distributor. Id.
Finally, a good distributor is able to forecast sales of the product, thus allowing for more
efficient output planning by the manufacturer. Id. These advantages were recognized by
the administrative law judge in Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978), when he found-
"Territorial restrictions ... facilitated the licensor's production planning by enabling
greater accuracy in calculating the forthcoming demand for syrup in a territory;, they
reduced the selling cost of the product by avoiding duplication of sales effort in a terri-
tory ... .. Id. at 532.
27. All of the distribution costs which were noted in the text require a capital outlay
which will fall either upon the manufacturer or the distributor. Thus, a manufacturer
may choose to distribute his product through an independent distributor if the manufac-
turer does not have the capital available to meet these distribution costs. The adminis-
trative law judge in Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978) described, in the findings of fact,
the soft drink bottlers as "independent businessmen who are required to make substan-
tial and continuing investments in plant, equipment, packaging and warehouse space."
Id. at 532.
28. If a product is characterized as a convenience good or impulse good, it is "gener-
ally sufficiently standardized for the customer to accept another brand if the one he
prefers is not in stock." Vertical Restrictions, supra note 20, at 1032 n. 62. With this
type of product, a manufacturer will use intensive distribution, attempting to get the
product into as many retail outlets as possible, thereby increasing the product's expo-
sure. See id. Soft drinks are impulse goods and they have certain marketing
requirements:
Constant sampling is necessary to maintain demand for a brand, and total availa-
bility of a brand at a multiplicity of outlets is essential to provide constant sam-
pling necessary to successful marketing of that brand. The soft drink industry is
also different from other industries in the broad range of flavors and package sizes
and types required to be made available to satisfy customer demand, in the need
for frequent local store-door service, the importance of in-store merchandising,
and the requirement of a store-door delivery system to sustain the use of a return-
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If a manufacturer chooses to distribute his product through
an independent distributor, but still wants to maintain some
control over his product, he may then choose among a "variety
of contractually arranged vertical restrictions."2 9 The vertical re-
strictions may take the form of an exclusive franchise, territorial
restrictions, or customer restrictions.30 Under an exclusive
franchise agreement, the manufacturer promises the distributor
or retailer that he will not sell his product to other outlets
within the latter's exclusive territory.31 In conjunction with the
granting of an exclusive franchise, the manufacturer often im-
poses territorial restrictions on the distributor or retailer,
whereby the latter promises that he will not sell the product
outside of a defined geographic area. Customer restrictions re-
quire a promise by the distributor or retailer that he will not sell
the product to certain customers who may be within his geo-
graphic area, but are excepted for some other reason. For exam-
ple, the manufacturer may prohibit the distributor from selling
to certain large customers who the manufacturer wants to re-
serve for himself.88
A distribution system containing some vertical restraints is
an intermediate form of distribution between the vertically inte-
grated system and a system with completely independent dis-
tributors. It allows the manufacturer to maintain control over
certain aspects of the product's distribution,' while relinquish-
able container.
Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 532-33 (1978) (initial decision of Administrative Law
Judge).
29. Vertical Restrictions, supra note 20, at 1033-34; See the discussion of vertical
sales restrictions, supra note 1.
30. Restricted Channels, supra note 3, at 796.
31. Id.
32. Id. Territorial restrictions generally take two forms. One is the location clause,
where an authorized retailer promises to sell the product only from one retail outlet at a
designated location. Under such an agreement, the retailer's sales will be limited to cus-
tomers who live within close enough proximity to the retailer's outlet to feasibily travel
to it. See id.
Territorial restrictions placed on a distributor require a promise that he will not sell
to retail outlets outside of a defined geographic area. The size of his area depends solely
on the contract he has with the manufacturer. See id.
33. Id.
34. One important control which the manufacturer may wish to maintain is quality
control. In the soft drink industry, the syrup company manufactures the soft drink syrup
and sells it to the bottler, who in turn manufactures, bottles, and distributes the finished
[Vol. 2:249
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ing control over other aspects to the distributor. 5 It also allows
the manufacturer and distributor to share in the distribution
costs."6
This intermediate form of distribution represents a 'compro-
mise which a manufacturer feels he must make in order to get
aggressive distributors. 7 The granting of an exclusive franchise,
with territorial restrictions to protect it, is a recognition by the
manufacturer of the capital expenditure and risk which a dis-
tributor undertakes in accepting and financing a franchise. An
exclusive franchise, with territorial restrictions, provides some
assurances to the distributor that his investment will be recov-
ered. This encourages distributors to market the products of a
new manufacturer or market the new products of an established
manufacturer. 3
A franchise contract between the manufacturer and his dis-
tributor will often require the distributor to meet certain stan-
dards and to perform certain duties to protect the product's
name and to ensure the product's performance.8 ' Some of the
product. The bottling process must, however, comply with the syrup manufacturer's
quality standards and specifications. See Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 633 (1978).
35. Under his distribution agreement with Coca-Cola Co., "Itihe bottler decides on
the plant and equipment to be used, the volume of production by size and type of
container and product mix, as well as the price to be charged and the manner in which
he can maximize his market penetration and secure the widest possible distribution of
trademarked soft drinks throughout his territory." Id.
36. The syrup manufacturer and the bottler frequently engage in joint advertising
and promotional programs. Id.
37. Restricted Channels, eupra note 3, at 805.
38. The Supreme Court in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36,
55 (1977), recognized this fact as one of the positive effects of vertical restrictions. In
Coca-Cola Co., however, the Federal Trade Commission properly noted that this argu-
ment offers support only to the "new entrant or a failing or faltering firm." Coca-Cola
Co., 91 F.T.C. at 626. It stated that in the case of Coca-Cola Co.:
[Territorial restrictions are not serving the interests of competition in aid of an
aspiring new entrant or a failing or faltering firm which cannot otherwise find
investors to put up the distribution capital necessary to market its product. In
this instance, the restraint is reducing the entrepreneurial risk of investment by
lessening competition among the firms which wholesale one of the most popular
consumer product lines in American industry.
Id. at 627.
39. See Restricted Channels, supra note 3, at 806. Contractual requirements might
be as follows:
1) Distributor required to meet certain standards in his building and warehouse
facilities in order for the product to be sold in attractive surroundings;
2) Distributor required to carry a certain amount of inventory,
9
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common requirements are for servicing,40 merchandising," and
quality control.'2 A distributor will also often perform certain
services and engage in costly activities aimed at establishing
goodwill.43 Without territorial restrictions, one distributor may
be able to take a "free-ride" on another distributor's efforts to
comply with these requirements which promote the product's
name and promote goodwill in the distributor's territory.44 The
distributor who has spent considerable money to provide ser-
vices and merchandising might be undersold in his own territory
by a competing distributor who is able to reduce his overhead,
and thus his prices, by not providing these services and mer-
chandising.45 Territorial restrictions prohibit the free-riding dis-
tributor from transshipping4 6 into another distributor's territory
and thus encourage the latter distributor to provide services and
merchandising by making it profitable for him to do so.47
3) Distributor required to carry on a certain amount of promotional activity.
Id. at 806-07.
40. Service has been described as an extremely important factor in promoting inter-
brand competition. See Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517, 566 (1978). Service in the soft
drink industry includes: frequency of delivery by route salesmen, including weekends;
cleaning and filling coolers; sorting empty bottles, repairing vending machines. Id. Also,
soft drink bottlers "service unprofitable accounts to have the product available in as
many outlets as possible. Id. at 546.
41. Soft drink bottlers merchandise the product by competing in food store outlets
for adequate shelf space and for placement of point-of-sale advertising. The obtainment
and proper placement of vending machines is also an important merchandising tool in
this industry. Id. at 565. ,
42. One of the major concerns of the bottler and syrup manufacturer is that the
consumer obtain a fresh and good-tasting product. To this end, soft drink bottlers are
required to maintain quality control over the product by means of proper stock rotation.
If old product is discovered in a retail account, the salesman will replace it with new
product and dispose of the old. Id. at 545. Furthermore, "[flailure on the part of a bot-
tler to meet the quality standards it has established may trigger one of the few contin-
gencies justifying the forefeiture of a bottler's bottling rights." Id. at 608.
43. Soft drink bottlers "build demand for Coca-Cola,. . by generating good will in
the community, and have become identified with their products in their communities."
Id. at 540. Bottlers generate this good will by supplying soft drinks for special events,
such as school picnics and football games. Id. at 565.
44. See Note, Vertical Territorial Restrictions Judged Under Rule of Reason, 52,
TuL. L. Rav. 389, 394 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Vertical Territorial Restrictions].
45. Id.
46. "Transshipping" is a term which describes a practice whereby one distributor
sells products outside of his designated geographic territory, into another distributor's
territory, thus violating the latter distributor's exclusive franchise rights.
47. Vertical Territorial Restrictions, supra note 44, at 394.
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Although the business justifications for vertical restrictions
are great, the effect of their use is widely debated. The debate
centers on vertical restraints' effects on competition. One school
of economic thought maintains that a manufacturer should be
allowed to decide how to market his product.48 Another school of
economic thought, arguing for pure competition, maintains that
consumers and the law of supply and demand should determine
what and where goods will be sold.4 9 The courts have also en-
tered into this debate, ruling both for and against vertical re-
straints. The legal treatment of vertical restraints reflects the
courts' recognition of the potential anticompetitive effects of, as
well as the business justifications for, vertical restraints.
III. Legal Treatment of Vertical Restraints
A. White Motor Co.
In 1948, the Justice Department issued a policy statement
in which it contended that territorial and customer restrictions
were illegal per se.50 Most companies accepted the government's
contention and litigation on these issues ended in consent de-
crees.5 1 Therefore, White Motor Co. v. United States," decided
in 1963, was the first case in which the Supreme Court examined
vertically imposed territorial restrictions. The Court refused to
declare vertical restraints illegal per se, noting that they may or
may not produce unacceptable restraints on trade.53 It did not,
however, "know enough of the economic and business stuff out
of which these arrangements emerge to be certain."" The Court
48. See Vertical Restrictions, supra note 19, at 1036 (citing Comanor, Vertical Ter-
ritorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and Its Aftermath, 81 HAnv. L. Ray.
1419, 1427-32 (1968)).
49. Id. (citing Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and
Market Division (pt. 2), 75 YALE L. J. 337, 403 (1966)).
50. See Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Automobile Legislation of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 84th Cong., 2d Seas. 362 (1956).
51. Monograph, supra note 1, at 7. For a list of citations to numerous consent de-
crees in various industries see id. at 7 n. 17.
52. 372 U.S. 253 (1963). This case involved the distribution system of a truck manu-
facturer which included territorial clauses which limited or restricted "the territories
within which the distributors... may sell and [included) limitations... on the persons
or classes of persons to whom they may sell." Id. at 255.
53. Id. at 263.
54. Id. The Court stated that more should be known about the impact of vertical
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also refused to apply the rule of reason, but held merely "that
the legality of the territorial and customer limitations should be
determined only after a trial."55 Although the Supreme Court
did not specifically apply either the per se rule or the rule of
reason, it has been suggested that the Court, by implication, pre-
ferred the rule of reason. 58
B. Schwinn
Departing from the uncertainty of White Motor Co., the Su-
preme Court held in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 57
that certain vertical restrictions in Schwinn's distribution sys-
tem constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act.58
Schwinn marketed its bicycles through 22 wholesale distributors
who were assigned specific territories. Schwinn also designated
its franchise retail dealers and required them to obtain their bi-
cycles from an authorized distributor. Schwinn's distribution
method had three variations: 1) Schwinn sold bicycles to the
wholesalers for resale to the retailers; 2) Schwinn sold bicycles to
the retailers on consignment or by agency arrangements with the
distributors; and, 3) Schwinn sold the bicycles to the retailers
under the "Schwinn Plan" whereby Schwinn shipped the bi-
cycles directly to the retailer, extended him credit, and paid the
distributor a commission on the sale. The charge was that
Schwinn's distributors, instructed to sell only to franchised re-
tailers within a certain geographic area,59 did not compete with
restraints in order to determine whether they justify application of the per se rule; to
determine whether they have such a "pernicious effect on competition and lack... any
redeeming virtue." Id. (quoting Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958)).
55. 372 U.S. at 264. The Supreme Court reversed the grant of summary judgment,
stating that summary judgment was improper for vertical restraints. Id.
56. Vertical Restrictions, supra note 20, at 1042. The author stated:
The majority noted that the restrictions might be allowable against aggressive
competitors or if they were the only practicable means a small company had for
breaking into or staying in business. Justice Brennan specifically noted several
justifications for vertical restrictions. Both opinions imply a rule of reason ap-
proach since allowing justifications is inconsistent with the per se test.
Id. at 1042 n. .135 (citation omitted).
57. 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
58. Id. at 372.
59. Id. Although there was not specific proof that Schwinn terminated the
franchises of retailers or distributors who violated the territorial exclusivity agreements,
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one another, and therefore were in conspiracy with Schwinn to
restrain trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.60
The Court found that the key factor in justifying applica-
tion of a per se rule was whether the manufacturer retained title,
dominion, and risk with respect to the product. It held that
"where a manufacturer sells his products to his distributor sub-
ject to territorial restrictions upon resale, a per se violation of
the Sherman Act results."'61 This was the first time the per se
rule had been applied to vertical restraints. Prior to Schwinn,
only the following stituations had invoked this rule: price
fixing,"2 tying arrangements," group boycotts,' and horizontal
the Court concluded that Schwinn had been" 'firm and resolute' in insisting upon obser-
vance of territorial and customer limitations." Id.
60. Id. at 371. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides in part:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
is declared to be illegal.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
61. 388 U.S. at 379 (following the district court's decision). The Court noted
Under the Sherman Act, it is unreasonable without more for a manufacturer to
seek to restrict and confine areas or persons with whom an article may be traded
after the manufacturer has parted with dominion over it. Such restraints are so
obviously destructive of competition that their mere existence is enough.
Id. (citation omitted). On the other hand, the Court retained the rule of reason as the
standard to be applied when the manufacturer retains title, dominion and risk with re-
spect to the product. Id. at 380.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 US. 29 (1960); Kiefer-Stew-
ard Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); cf. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
321 U.S. 707, 728-29 (1944) (restrictive practices which are ancillary to price fixing are
not allowed). Price-fixing is defined as "[tihe cooperative setting of price levels or ranges
by competing firms." BLACK'S LAW DicaroNASv 1070 (5th ed. 1979).
63. See, e.g., Fortner Enter. Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969);
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Times-Picayune Publishing
Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337
U.S. 293 (1949). A tying arrangement exists when a manufacturer requires the buyer to
purchase one good in order to get another. The latter good is usually the one that is
particularly in demand and may be patented so that the buyer may be forced to buy
from that particular manufacturer in order to get the product he wants. See also Anti-
trust Law-Tying Arrangements and Per Se Illegality, 38 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 483 (1970)
(casenote on the Forner decision).
64. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Group
boycott is defined as "[a] concerted refusal by traders to deal with other traders. Such is
unlawful per se because it restrains freedom of parties to the boycott independently to
decide whether to deal with boycotted party." BLAcK's LAw DxcrToNARY 633 (5th ed.
1979).
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divisions of markets.6 5
C. Sylvania
Ten years after Schwinn, the Supreme Court in Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,66 examined a distribution sys-
tem indistinguishable from Schwinn's in "intent and competitive
impact. ' 67 Sylvania distributed its televisions through a limited
number of franchised retail outlets in a geographic areae 8 The
franchisee was prohibited from selling Sylvania's products from
any location other than his designated outlet.69 The franchisee
was not granted an exclusive territory and Sylvania reserved the
right to designate additional retailers in an area.70 When Sylva-
nia franchised a new outlet in an area already serviced by Conti-
nental T.V., Continental objected and advised Sylvania of its in-
tent to expand its operation to a location not authorized by
Sylvania. 1 Sylvania reduced Continental's line of credit, and
Continental retaliated by withholding money it owed to the
finance company in charge of credit relations between Sylvania
and Continental." Sylvania terminated Continental's franchise
agreement, and the finance company sued Continental for the
payments due.78  Continental cross-claimed against Sylvania,
charging that Sylvania's marketing system violated section 1 of
the Sherman Act in that it restricted the locations from which
retailers could resell the products.7 '
The district court instructed the jury pursuant to the per se
65. See, e.g., United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967) (restraints that appear
vertical on their face, but upon closer examination are really horizontal, are illegal);
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (horizontal restraints
exist when persons who would normally be in competition with one another conspire to
divide up the territory among themselves); cf. United States v. General Motors Corp.,
384 U.S. 127, 142-45 (1966) (territorial restrictions which initally were vertically imposed
by the manufacturer, may with time take on a dominant horizontal character and be-
come illegal).
66. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
67. Id. at 46.
68. Id. at 38.
69. Id. (footnote omitted). See supra note 32 for a discussion of location clauses
70. Id. at 38.
71. Id. at 39.
72. Id. at 39-40 (footnote omitted).
73. Id. at 40.
74. Id. (footnote omitted).
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rule enunciated in Schwinn.7 It charged that "regardless of the
reasonableness, e76 any effort by Sylvania to restrict locations
from which its retailers could sell Sylvania's products was a vio-
lation of the Sherman Act.77 The jury found that Sylvania had
entered into a contract, combination, or conspiracy in restraint
of trade by virtue of its location clauses.7 8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 19
stated that Schwinn was "readily distinguishable"' 0 and held
that "an instruction incorporating the 'rule of reason' should
have been given to the jury.'81 The district court's judgment was
therefore reversed and remanded. 2 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari, stating that "the need for clarification of the law in
this area justifies reconsideration." 8
Unable to distinguish Schwinn, the Supreme Court in Syl-
vania overruled the per se rule,' and held that the legality of
vertical restraints should be determined by applying the rule of
reason.88 The Court reasoned that the rule of reason was the
proper standard because of the unique effects of vertical restric-
tions. It noted that "[t]he market impact of vertical restrictions
is complex because of their potential for a simultaneous reduc-
tion of intrabrand competition and stimulation of interbrand
competition."88 The Court further stated that the rule of reason
is appropriate for an analysis of vertical restrictions because it
allows the factfinder to weigh "all of the circumstances of a case
75. 433 U.S. at 40-41 (citing the district court opinion).
76. Id. at 41.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. GTE Sylania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F. 2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976).
80. Id. at 997.
81. Id. at 1001. The court of appeals noted that... Sylvania presented substantial
evidence from which the jury might have reasonably concluded that Sylvania's location
practice, rather than unreasonably restricting competitive market forces, actually had a
procompetitive effect.. ." Id.
82. Id. at 1004.
83. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 47 (1977).
84. Id. at 58.
85. Id. at 59. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and
the case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. On remand, the
district court granted Sylvania's motion for summary judgment, holding that its chosen
method of distribution "was not an unreasonable restraint of trade." Continental T.V.,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1046, 1052 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
86. 433 U.S. at 51-52 (footnotes omitted).
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in deciding whether a restrictive practice should be prohibited
as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition. '8 7 Under
this standard the factfinder may consider the business justifica-
tions for vertical restraints as well as their effects on
competition.
D. Post-Sylvania
Since Sylvania, courts presented with distribution systems
containing territorial restrictions have begun their analyses by
determining whether the restraints were vertical or horizontal."
When the restraint was classified as vertical, the courts applied
the rule of reason to judge its legality.89 In applying the rule of
reason the courts have narrowed their focus to the effects of ver-
tical restraints on interbrand competition.
Even while restricting their analyses to vertical restraints'
effects on interbrand competition, the courts have reached am-
biguous conclusions with regard to their legality.90 This ambigu-
87. Id. at 49 (footnote omitted).
88. See, e.g., Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F. 2d 292, 295 (5th Cir.
1981); Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1004 (5th Cir.
1981).
89. See, e.g., Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F. 2d 292, 295 (5th Cir.
1981); Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001, 1004 (5th Cir.
1981); Lamp Liquors, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 563 F.2d 425, 432 (10th Cir. 1977);
Adolph Coors Co. v. A & S Wholesalers, Inc., 561 F. 2d 807, 813 (10th Cir. 1977).
90. See, e.g., cases applying the rule of reason and holding that the vertical re-
straints were legal, Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d at 295; Red Diamond
Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d at 1004; Del Rio Distributing, Inc. v.
Adolph Coors Co., 589 F.2d 176, 178 (5th Cir. 1979); JBL Enter., Inc. v. Jhirmack Enter.,
519 F. Supp. 1084, 1088-89 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
In Norman Williams Co. v. Rice, 108 Cal. App. 3d 348, 166 Cal. Rptr. 563 (1980)
cert. granted, -U.S. - , 102 S. Ct. 632 (1981), however, the California Court of
Appeal struck down a California statute which enforced vertical restrictions prohibiting
state importers of alcoholic beverages from purchasing any brand of distilled spirits un-.
less designated by the distiller as the authorized brand representative. With the statute
invalidated, unauthorized importers were able to procure national brand spirits from an-
other state, transship them into California, and undersell the California wholesalers des-
ignated by the distiller. The distillers were unable to enforce the controls on their distri-
bution system and the authorized wholesalers were unable to protect their status or
investment. The court applied the rule of reason and distinguished Sylvania by noting
that in this case, the state was providing authority for the distillers to prohibit the
wholesalers from trading with each other. Id. at 356, 166 Cal. Rptr. at 570.
The Supreme Court reversed the California Court of Appeal, stating: "It is irrele-
vant for our purposes that the distiller's ability to restrict intrabrand competition in
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol2/iss2/3
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ity is apparent in the results reached in the soft drink cases. An
administrative law judge and the Federal Trade Commission,
each applying the rule of reason, examined the effects of vertical
restraints on interbrand competition in the soft drink industry
and reached opposite conclusions: One court held that the terri-
torial restrictions did not unreasonably restrain competition,9 '
and the other court held that they did."
The Soft Drink Act was enacted partially in response to the
ambiguity concerning the legality of certain vertical restraints in
the soft drink industry. It was enacted to "clarify the circum-
stances under which territorial provisions in licenses to manu-
facture, distribute and sell trademarked soft drink products are
lawful under the antitrust laws."' 5
IV. Analysis
A. The Standard Defined
Section 2 of the Soft Drink Act states:
Nothing contained in any antitrust law shall render unlawful the
inclusion and enforcement in any trademark licensing contract or
agreement, pursuant to which the licensee engages in the manu-
facture .. ., distribution, and sale of a trademarked soft drink
product, of provisions granting the licensee the sole and exclusive
right to manufacture, distribute, and sell such product in a de-
fined geographic area or limiting the licensee, directly or indi-
rectly, to the manufacture, distribution, and sale of such product
only for ultimate resale to consumers within a defined geographic
area: Provided: That such product is in substantial and effective
competition with other products of the same general class in the
relevant market or markets."
California has the imprimatur of a state statute." Rice v. Norman-Williams Co., 50
U.S.L.W. 5052, 5054 (U.S. June 29, 1982) (Nos. 80-1012, 80-1030, 80-1052) (citation
omitted). The Supreme Court held that a state statute will not be facially incompatible
with the federal antitrust laws unless it mandates behavior which would be in all in-
stances per se illegal. Id. The California statute does not compel behavior which is per se
illegal since non-price vertical restraints, under the Syluania ruling, are judged by the
rule of reason. Id.
91. Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. at 589 (initial decision of Administrative Law Judge).
92. Id. at 674 (final order).
93. Preamble to the Soft Drink Act, supra note 7.
94. Soft Drink Act, supra note 7, § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 3501.
1982]
17
PACE LAW REVIEW
The Soft Drink Act sets a standard to determine when
agreements granting an exclusive franchise to, or imposing terri-
torial restrictions on, soft drink bottlers will be lawful under the
antitrust laws. The standard is whether there is substantial and
effective interbrand competition. The Act states specifically that
these agreements will be legal provided there is "substantial and
effective" 5 competition among "products of the same general
class."9
In determining the effects of vertical restraints on inter-
brand competition in the soft drink industry, courts should ex-
amine competition among all brands and types of soft drinks.
Courts, however, should also narrow their analyses and examine
competition among each type of soft drink. For instance, they
should examine competition among all available colas, sepa-
rately from an analysis of competition among other flavored soft
drinks. For this analysis, colas would become the "products of
the same general class." Even though interbrand competition in
the soft drink industry in general is strong, lack of competition
in one particular flavor of soft drink might make the vertical
restraints imposed by the manufacturer of that flavor
unreasonable.
An analysis of interbrand competition might focus on sev-
eral factors. Manufacturers of different brands compete in the
following ways:
1) Pricing and price promotions;
2) Service;
3) Product availability in fountain accounts, vending machines,
sports and other special events;
4) Package availability;
5) Merchandising; including shelf-space, on and off-premise
point-of-sale;
6) Advertising.
Congress, discussing the standard of the Soft Drink Act, noted
the following additional factors as relevant to an analysis of in-
terbrand competition:
[T]he number of brands and types of flavors available of soft
95. Id.
96. Id.
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drinks; the persistence of long-run anti-comptetitive profits; the
number of retail price options available to consumers; the exis-
tence of inefficiency and waste;... ease of entry into the market;
the number and strength of sellers of directly competing products
in a relevant market;. .... ,,. 7
Although it is clear that the standard of the Soft Drink Act
is interbrand competition, it is not clear how much competition
is necessary to make the vertical restrictions in agreements be-
tween syrup manufacturers and their bottlers lawful. The lan-
guage of the Act states that competition must be "substantial
and effective."981 Courts may find guidance in defining this re-
quirement by examining previous cases which applied the rule of
reason standard. In such cases, the courts have considered the
significance of relative market share, or market power. 9 One
court noted, "if a firm lacks market power, it cannot affect the
price of its product; and thus any vertical restraint could not be
anticompetitive at the interbrand level."100 Thus, the amount of
market share possessed by a company is linked to its ability to
adversely affect interbrand competition. Presumably, at some
point when one manufacturer's market share becomes too large,
interbrand competition will no longer be "substantial and effec-
tive." But no court has suggested a formula indicating how much
market share is necessary before a company has the ability to
adversely affect interbrand competition. Courts must still ex-
amine all the facts and circumstances peculiar to the case.
The Soft Drink Act also states that interbrand competition
must be substantial and effective "in the relevant market or
markets."10 1 Therefore, courts should identify the relevant mar-
kets when considering a manufacturer's market share. For exam-
ple, a syrup manufacturer may have a de minimus nationwide
market share, while at the same time have a very large market
97. H.R. Rm,. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. Naws 2373, 2377.
98. Soft Drink Act, supra note 7, § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 3501.
99. See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Muen-
ster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F. 2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981); JBL Enter., Inc. v.
Jhirmack Enter., 519 F. Supp. 1084, 1090-91 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
100. Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d at 298 (quoting Posner, The
Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per se Legality, 48 U.
Cm. L. REv. 6, 16 (1981)).
101. Soft Drink Act, supra note 7, § 2, 15 U.S.C.A. § 3501.
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share in one particular geographic area. In such a situation, in-
terbrand competition in that particular geographic area may not
be substantial and effective and therefore the vertical restraints
between the manufacturer and the bottlers in that area would
not be lawful. If examined in light of the nationwide market,
however, interbrand competition would be substantial and effec-
tive and the vertical restraints therefore lawful.
B. The Standards Compared
The Supreme Court in Sylvania, applying the rule of rea-
son, stated that "interbrand competition. . is the primary con-
cern of antitrust law.'1 02 In applying the rule of reason, courts
have focused on interbrand competition, to the exclusion of al-
most all other factors, and have accepted the legality of vertical
restraints which eliminate intrabrand competition, but promote
interbrand competition.103 Yet opponents of the Soft Drink Act
contend that an analysis under the rule of reason must also ex-
amine the effects of vertical restraints on intrabrand competi-
tion."0 " Their contention, however, is not supported by case law.
For example, in Sylvania, the Court, describing the marketing
strategy and distribution system of GTE Sylvania, noted that
"[a]n acknowledged purpose.., was to decrease the number of
competing Sylvania dealers."10 5 Even though Sylvania's market-
ing strategy eliminated intrabrand competition, the Court ac-
cepted it as a reasonable business practice. Similarly, in Muen-
ster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 06 the Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit observed: "although Stewart's practices may have
reduced intrabrand competition between. . . [two Zenith retail-
ers] somewhat, interbrand competition between Zeniths and
other brands remained strong; indeed, it increased."'07
The above examples indicate that the standard of the Soft
102. 433 U.S. 36, 52 n. 19 (1977).
103. See, e.g., Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F. 2d at 296-98; Del Rio
Distributing, Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 589 F. 2d 176, 177-78 (5th Cir. 1979); JBL Enter.,
Inc. v. Jhirmack Enter., 519 F. Supp. 1084, 1088 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
104. See H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d sess. 1, reprinted in 1980 U. S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 2373, 2387 (dissenting views of Reps. Edward, Conyers, and Drinan).
105. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 368 (1977).
106. 651 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1981).
107. Id. at 296.
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Drink Act and the standard of the rule of reason, as applied, are
no different. Both standards focus on interbrand competition
and consider the same factors in their analyses of vertical re-
straints. Yet the approaches of the two standards are signifi-
cantly different. The application of the rule of reason standard
requires a negative approach: Here the courts examine the verti-
cal restraints to determine whether they produce any adverse ef-
fects on interbrand competition. The application of the standard
of the Soft Drink Act requires a posititve approach: Here the
courts accept the legality of vertical restraints provided there is
"substantial and effective" competition among "products of the
same general class." Under the former standard the courts must
look for competition which has become weak; under the latter
standard the courts must look for competition which has re-
mained strong.
The standard of the Soft Drink Act further reflects a posi-
tive approach because it recognizes the business justifications for
vertical restraints and positively states the validity of their use
in the current distribution systems of the soft drink industry. An
analysis under the Soft Drink Act begins with the assumption
that there are valid business justifications for vertical restraints,
and focuses directly on their effects on interbrand competition
to determine whether they are lawful. Under the rule of reason
standard, vertical restraints are slightly more suspect than they
are under the Soft Drink Act. Under the rule of reason, the busi-
ness justifications are neither presumptively valid, nor presump-
tively invalid. The court must first make detailed findings of fact
and closely examine the circumstances peculiar to the case, to
determine whether there are valid business reasons to justify the
vertical restraints. This often results in lengthy trials and an ar-
duous fact finding process.108
C. The Standard Applied
With its emphasis on interbrand competition, the territorial
exclusivity provisions embodied in soft drink distribution sys-
tems are likely to survive the application of the Soft Drink Act
108. For example, the findings of fact in the initial decision of the administrative
law judge in Coca-Cola Co. were contained in 53 pages. The bulk of these findings cen-
tered on the business justifications for the restrictions in the soft drink industry.
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standard. Courts applying that standard will note that inter-
brand competition among major manufacturers is stiff.1 0' Fur-
ther, regional brands are in healthy competition with national
brands.1 0 The consumer is presented with many retail options
in both packaging and pricing, which reflect the existence of
products "in substantial and effective competition with other
products of the same general class."
Nothing assures the soft drink industry of permanent ac-
ceptance of its territorial restrictions. The market could
change,1 reducing the nature and extent of interbrand competi-
tion. Nothing precludes further examination of the market and a
determination that the industry does not conform to the stan-
dards of the Soft Drink Act. Because of this, contrary to its crit-
ics' contention, the Soft Drink Act does not totally exempt the
soft drink industry from the antitrust laws.112
109. In Coca-Cola Co., 91 F.T.C. 517 (1978), the administrative law judge noted the
existence of interbrand competition in the soft drink industry, stating- "[Coke) [b]ottlers
compete within their territories against national brands of soft drinks such as Pepsi-
Cola, Seven-Up, Royal Crown, Canada Dry, Dr. Pepper, and Shasta, and against regional
brands such as Rock Creek, Faygo, and Vernor's private label brands." Id. at 542.
110. One practice which stimilates competition from regional brands in the soft
drink industry is "piggybacking", whereby local bottlers become licensees for more than
one syrup manufacturer. This practice allows a new manufacturer to take advantage of
the marketing expertise of the bottler, and the bottler to test a new product without
extensive additional capital expenditure. The incidence of piggybacking is widespread, as
evidenced by the fact that in 1971, 438 of the 726 domestic Coca-Cola bottlers also han-
dled at least one other brand. H. R. REP. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d Ses. 1, reprinted in
1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. N.ws 2373, 2374.
111. At present, the large multiplant bottler dominates the industry with 70% of
the total soft drink sales. In 1950, there were over 6,000 bottling plants. In 1980, there
were approximately 2,000 plants, run by 1,700 companies. In 1972, the largest 50 bottlers
controlled 45% of the domestic soft drink sales. Id. These figures are certainly subject to
change. If the courts find in the future that the large bottlers have gained an even
greater share of the market and are monopolistic in their practices, their distribution
systems might be held invalid under the Soft Drink Act standard. Since one of the stated
purposes of the Act was to prevent the demise of the small bottlers and small distribu-
tors, any trend tending to negate this purpose would receive close scrutiny.
112. Section 3 of the Soft Drink Act specifically states:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed to legalize the enforcement of provisions
described in section 2 [15 U.S.C.A. § 15011 of this Act in trademark licensing con-
tracts or agreements described in that section by means of price fixing agreements,
horizontal restraints of trade, or group boycotts, if such agreements, restraints, or
boycotts would otherwise be unlawful.
Soft Drink Act, supra note 7, § § 6, 3,115 U.S.C.A. § 3502.
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V. Conclusion
The Soft Drink Act standard is a positive restatement of
the rule of reason. Although its approach is significantly differ-
ent, the result of its application is the same. Both standards re-
quire an examination of the marketplace and a detailed exami-
nation of the facts peculiar to the case to determine the effects
of vertical restraints on interbrand competition. If the vertical
restraints have an adverse effect on interbrand competition, they
will be invalid under either standard.
The Soft Drink Act is significant because of its positive ap-
proach. First, it gives the soft drink industry some assurance
that the distribution systems which it has employed for 75 years
will be lawful. Second, it aids the soft drink manufacturers and
bottlers in economic planning by letting them know beforehand
whether their marketing and distribution systems will be valid.
Without such knowledge, the manufacturer risks extensive and
expensive litigation, a frequent occurrence in the soft drink in-
dustry.113 Third, a bottler who makes a substantial investment
to become a franchisee with the promise of an exclusive territory
will know ahead of time if his investment will be protected. This
is particularly important if the bottler is a representative for a
single manufacturer and the very existence of his business de-
pends on the legality of his arrangement with that manufac-
turer. These reasons clarify the importance and need for the soft
drink industry to have a positive statement regarding the legal-
ity of their distribution systems.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, an ad-
ministrative law judge, and the Federal Trade Commission each
expressed their belief that the standard of the Soft Drink Act
differed from that of the rule of reason. Yet they did not define
or apply the Soft Drink Act standard. It will be interesting to
see how they define the standard in the future and what the re-
sult of its application will be. It is very likely that all will con-
clude that, in practice, the two standards are not different after
all.
Anna Bilden Parker
113. See supra notes 16 and 19.
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